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1\xtists9 Workers, and the Lavv of ¥0or k �
Keynote Addres§

HOWARD LESNICK

I

can best open what I wan t to sav by beginning as I do in mv cour se in

Law and a Market Econom y wtth a storv attnbuted to Ptcasso. In hts
.

Cubist period, he was p aintin g a picture of a woman. One day when the
work was almost finished, the woman's husband dropped by the studio to

dri ve her home. P icasso showed him the picture and said, "Well, what do
vou think?" The husband said it was really verv nice, but it didn't look

anything like his wife. \A/hereupon Picasso said, "\A/ell, what does your
wife look like'!"

( His

wife was sitting the r e all the tirne. ) The husband

reache d into his wallet. took out a photograph. and hand e d it to Picasso,
saying "That's what she looks l i ke

. "

Picasso examined the p i c ture for a

long time, then gave it back to the husband and s a i d , "I didn't realize she
was so small.''

Now when I talk to l a w students. who are a notoriously unimaginati ve
and literal-minded bunch, I go on to explain the story as only a notoriously

uni magin ati \ e and literal-minded person would trv
'

of artists and their c amp fol l o w e rs

,

w

do; in the company

I sh rink from doing that. What I take

the story to be saying is that our perceptions of realitv are embedded in
unspo ken premises-such as, a photograph is not

a

li fe siz e representation

Howard Lesnick is D1stin,r;uished Professor of Law at CiiJ' Umuersi�y of New York Law
School at Queem College. He has taught law for 2 5 years, for most of that lime a/ the Ulllversil_y

of Penn.ryluania. He is the author, with others, of Becoming a Lawver: A Humanistic
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but is otherwise lifelike. Of course, even that statement is not literally true

either, when t he p hotograph is not in color or the color is known to corre
spond only slightly to what our eyes see.
More broadly, our perception of reality is a social construct. I t is not
surprising that artists should be one profession, probably the fi r st to realize
,

the truth of that concept; but it is important for you t o realize, whether you
are a lawyer or not, that such a perception is not only true of the arts, but is
true of th e law. And it is true of the world around us; the way we see the
vvorld is a social construct. I t is the way we view r eality; much of what we
think of as simply a description of rea lity is also a social construct. That is

not to say it's wrong, not to say it is an illusion or delusion. It's something
more complex.
vVhat I want to talk about is what I refer to as the notion of a con
sciousness of work. There has been in our society for the last couple of
dred vears

hun

a consciou sness of work-I call it the prevailing consciousness

which has had an enormous impact on the way \Ve think about work and on
the \\·av the law of work has e\·olved. There is also an alternative conscious
ness of work, a different way of looking at it. It is interesting to think about
this idea in the context of the arts. It is obvious that in many ways the ar

tistic professions are th e home of that alternative consciousness. I will say
more about that in a moment, but I first want to spell out what I mean by a
consciousness of \vork: an entire set of mutually reinforcing premises,
priorities, and perceptions that answer the question, "vVhat do people do
when thcv work.)" We have a set of answers to those questions that some
times

is largely implicit: thev are not stated or are sometimes stated as if

they are self-e\·ident, as simply a description of reality. This room is rec
tangular: that is a picture

of a beach; the lights are on. Those perceptions

are not \·iewed as social constructs. Thev are viewed as simple descriptions

of fact.
VVhat is the prevailing consciousness of work0 In tvvo words, it is that

work is an exchange relation. It's a contract. It is the giving up of leisure in
exchange for something else. Economists say, of course, that leisure is a
good thing: vou give up leisure, you \VOrk, and vou get something back.
Thar is

a

short ans,,er that has an awful lot riding

w ith

it. A number of

thing s llO\\ from that view. I don't want to dwell on all of them, but let me
mention SC\'Cral. Most important, of course, is that such an analogy quickly

unites the \\·ork relation to our traditional notions of contract and exchange,
both in

]a,,· and in our ideologv generallv. It is

tion. There

a

vol un t ar y

,

bilateral

rela

is no right to \\·ork. There is no right to a job; there's simply a

right, ih·ou will, to look for one. Iviore salient, perhaps, is the idea that the
utilicv of '::hat

a .,_,

orker does is external to the worker. Utilitv is largelv

defined bv the user. initiallv the
.JO

e m ploy

er

-

will somebody hire vou"!-anc!
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ultimately society because the employer is typically hiring you in order to
sell something that you helped make or do. So I can imagine myself a basso
profunda, but nobody credits that unless somebody's willing to pay me to
sing. The same thing goes for being a lavvyer, a waiter, a cab driver, or any
thing else. The utility of what you do is external to you.
In this paradigm the value of what you do to yourself, the meaning of
vour work, is that it is a means to self-sufficiency. That is what you get

back.

You get back an income that (one hopes) can support life. You get

back whatever status comes with the job. That again, I think, is a decep
tively simple set of statements that has an enormous hold on our percep
tions, and that legitimates and de-legitimates an awful lot of things Vie
struggle about. So, for example, a corrolary suggests that what you put into
your job, what is your business and what is not, is defined by the notion of

role. Certainly lawyers, who you might think of as professionals or in some
sense as artists, are very much a part of that paradigm-as a lawyer I have
a certain job, to be loyal to my client, to be skeptical. The idea is endemic;
it is true of all jobs. The role that you have is not defined by you, except in
the sense that you took the job. In the legal sense vou took it voluntarily:
you might have been delighted; it might be a wonderful job; you might feel
you are being overpaid or overvalued; it might be a terrible job; you might
feel you are being exploited; you might have had six choices; vou might
have been unemployed for

a

year. In some sense those factors all matter,

but thev do not change the fact that once vou take the job, the role is de
fined for you by the job and initially bv the employer.
There is a wonderful case that illustrates all of this. It is one of the deci
sions that has been corning along in the last ten years, attempting to limit
the employer's power to discharge emplovees at will where there is no col
lective bargaining agreement. The cast: invoked a salesman who sold steel
products and who thought that a

new

product \vas unsafe. He told his boss,

"You know, I don't think it's really a good product. You shouldn't sell it."
The boss said, "Don't worry, the engineers have cleared it." which they
had. Still the salesman

was

troubled. He di dn t call Ralph Nader: he didn't
'

go to the newspapers. He vvent to th e vice president of the company, vvho
happened to be his personal friend, and told him, "You knm,v, you really
ought to look into this. I think thev made a mistake." So the company
looked into it, and they found the statesmanlike personnel solution. They
recalled the product and fired the salesman.
He brought

a

suit, vvhich had no statutorv basis, and he argued the ob

vious point-that there is a strong public policy in safetv, in not letting
employers fire people for pressing this kind of complaint. The court's
answer was this:
Certainly the potential for abuc'e of an employer's power of dismissal is par-
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ticularly serious when an employee must exercise independent expert judg
ment. But Geary does not hold himself out as this sort of emplovee. He was in
volved onl\' in the sale of products. Ther·e is no suggestion that he possessed
any expert qualifications or that his duties extended to making judgments in
matters of product safetv.

In other vvords, as evervone knovvs, if you're a salesman, you are supposed
to say hmv great the product is, not how bad it is. He wasn't an engineer;
he wasn't

a

safety person. If he cared about safety-whether because he

cared about the company's reputation, his own reputation, or what hap
pened to other people, or just because he cared-that was his own business.
He could do whatever he wanted about that on his own time. He could
write a book. or he could look for another job. But it was not part of his job.
VVhv not ? Because the job was not defined to include caring about safety.
The case is a good example of an endemic attribute of the prevailing
notion about work. It illustrates for us that personal qualities, including
your own values, your own priorities, in a \·erv reai sense vourself, are a
frill. Those things are not a legitimate input to vour _job, vour ernplovabil

itv. or what vou do in your job.
There are other contexts illustrating this point. An ex::m1ple is the

so

called "lifestvlc" case in which men with long hair or beards or women

with pants are not hired unless thev conform to a norm. The prn·ailing
viev,· of work
cur

savs

"If vou want thejob. cut vour hair. If vou don't \van t to

�·:our hair, that'3 okay. but vou 're not

entiried co bring that part of vou

in. It i s not part of rhe jo b. '' The same is true about personal values. Again,
the prevailing \·iew holds that if YOU don't

''ant

to

tal·J' a job, vou don't

ha'.-e to, but vour personal values are nor a legitimate part of the job.

One of the prm,ocatil'e things that Theodore Bi!-:el said this morning
''-'as

chat wc�etl' �-�ews actors as

ack:1owkdged
:otbandon, for

as
\l

m

some wav disrcpu table; that

observa.tion i�� true, --.vhy actors
a.re

are

tho�.Jght of

21.s

e�sentia_lly ��elf-indulgent

'.vorking at so1nething because they like it or think

chat it is importam, not because somebodv is ··xilling

to

to

hire rhem. This is

that the\' don't care. because thev orwiousl\·
. ha1·e to care about

gettir:g hired. But rhere is
vcu

is not

·hic h thev hcl\·e to paY more for insuranu:'. One reason his

people, is that they
not to sa'-·
'

a c ti n g

propei· 1vork: and that actors are thought to lead lives of

a se n s e

in \vhich it's

a

personal quaiit\· that leads

want to ctct. And, in the dorninant paradigm. thcu qualitv is not con

sidcr�d terribh· relevant.
/-\ny beginning ac:tor confronts that attitude. -:{our parents tell you,
'· \. ou ll gro\v up, forget this acting business, and sell i nsu ranee like the rest
·

afus. Or ar·::

\'OU

going

w

be a kid

al

l your life?'' There is

a.

moral ducv to

ln;::dze �:ourse1fernployable. Ifan:\rthing .tnight k�·c:p you f(iJilJ getting ajob
;,vhethcr it's ty·ping your resurne \Vithout blotting the paper 'Nhen you sign
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your name, not shaving, or whatever (all the Horatio Alger stuff)-you do
t. More importantly, this attitude shapes your own goals in life and soci

i

ety. You want to be valued in the world, and it is basically a deal. I make

\\·idgets, people buy widgets, they pav me; everyone feels happy. It may be
ad\·antageous to vou, it may be advantageous to society, or disadvan
tageous to both. But it is essentially a transaction.
I believe that these ideas are mutually reinforcing, that they flow from
the basic view of work as an exchange relation, and that they have an enor
mous impact on what we think of as legitimate and illegitimate. And thev
are a social construct.
Now as I said. there is an alternati\·e consciousness. I don't mean by
that term to say that the traditional consciousness is not true. Obviouslv,
there is an exchange elemenr to work. But it is not the whole story. Again,
there is no need to chvell on the idea before this group. because in many
ways the vvhole notion of being an artist is that you are not "giving up"
something bv working, for which your pav compensates vou. This morn
ing, a dancer, speaking of her company, said "I had to give up dancing."
An economist would sav, "No, no, vou ·.v e re able to give up dancing. You
·

became a boss, and you didn't have to dance." \Nhen she worked, she did
so from an alternati,:e consciousness of \'iork. The central idea of that con
sci ousnes s is tha t part of \Our be ing a person is bound up with \vanting to

work , with \vanting robe useful, \\'ith wanting to express vour energy, your
creativitv, vour CCJnnec:tion to other p e opl e

.

It ne\·er suffices to describe

your work as giving up somethin g to get something back. You are also ex
pressing something that is important to vou.
It

foilows that the utilitv of w hat vou do is d e fine d internallv as well as

ex te rn allv. 'vVh<H that thought immecliatelv conjures up is the bad musician
hanging o ut in vVashingron Square Park, plaving the saxophone, and
answering his father's com plaint, "\Nlw don't

vou

get

a

job?" with, ''I'm

a mus i c i an : people drop m on ev in mv bo:�." That example sees t!1e ques
tion in polar terms: either soc i e t v defines utili tv, or its
vant. The real question.

as

judgment

is irrele

I see it, is more complex: hmv can vou follov,·

your \\·ork, \vhich has sc1f-Yalidated n1eaning and usefulness to youJ in

a

situation 1vhere vou ha\·e to get external validation t o o ? The external
validation is :wt unimporwnt and not irrelevant, but it is not the whole
storv because the u(ilitv of \vhat vou do is not defined by people's will
ingness to pav for it. Peopl'-" 's

IY

i llin g n e s s to pav for it may be

a necesso.rv

req uisite to vour being able to continue to do it. St ill , that self-validating
aspect is regarded as legitimate.

This rnorning

sorn.eone

s p o k e ?..bout moving tovva!�d exc(:llencc,

rTlO"i

ing to•lv"ard a corr1rnitrnent to exceJ.lence. In the traditioncJ paradigrr1, ho��v
do you kno\"i v1ho is .e��cellenr and \vho is not? YVhether it is

Summa 1986
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steel rails, the ans·wer is that what people buy, what people will pay for, is
excellent, and what people won't pay for is junk . As artists you reject t hat
,

and there is an urge in all of us to reject that. You say that you have some

sense that you can define excellence and hold on to it. It is slipp e r y as every
body knows, but the not ion involves a concept of intrinsic value not defined

by the market. And you avert that you can act out of it that awareness. A
worker's interest in his or her work is in part an extension of that person's
identity. It goes bevond what people will pay for.
So when the panelists spoke about regional t heatre and the notion of
an ensemble, it was to suggest a value in working together. What is the
basis of that value? vVhen I was in college, certain schools played good
basketball because the playe rs grew up in the same neighborhood and
played together for ten years so th ey could beat the hell out of everyone
else. That suggests one reason why it is important to wo rk together. But
,,

, hat I heard at this morning's panel was something that went beyond that.

Wholly apart from the commodity value of ensembles is another value
acting communally and being involved with people you care about, having
iess dissonance between home life and work life. And all of that rests on the
notion that your incJi,·idualitv is partlv consti tu t e d by your relation to
others; that is, the value societv places on what you do is not expressed
solelv as a transaction, but as a r el ation s h i p.
\Vhat strikes me is that, in many ways, the alternative consciousness is
the consciousness of the artist. It is also the consciousness of the profes
sional. If this were a

f r e n c e of lawvers or teachers and there were

co n e

lawvers and teachers in the room, I could make the same analysis. Tradi
tionall v, the professions are in ner-c!irectecl, more tenuously connected to
the market, and so forth. I would like to suggest a hypothesis: it is difficult
and problematic, I think, to make much headway in achieving legitimacy
in the world for that alternative consciousness for the
separate from the -.vorld of \\Ork generallv. G alb r ai th
cal purposes, drew

a \'(T\'

sharp dis<inction

see it more as a ccminu um. I

c an

art
,

s if it is viewed as

perhaps for rhetori

between certain tvpes of work. I

de:scri be it with three hypotheses. First,

the traditional consciousness of work both shapes the law and is reinforced
bv the law. It's
Second,

a

we

mutually reinforcing set of ideas.

sen s e

we know, acutelv in some cases, th e incornplete

or

ness of the traditional consc;ousncss. It fails to describe fu!lv what we do as
we work, and it produces resuits, human results, that are deeply p;·oblem
atic-unemplovment, discrimination, lo w wages, occupational inju r y and
,

so on. At che same time. it

seems

description of realitv. TvVork
-..vorld; we do rebte tn

tions. As
44

a

result

we

e ac

are

is

ine,·itable; it seems that it is not a simple

an n:change relation; this z's a commodity

h other

e s se

nti ally as an endless series of negotia



trapped in this dissonance bet\veen dissatisfaction
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and the inability to see any alternative as other than a romantic fantasy.
And efforts to act out of an alternative consciousness tend to be captured
over time by the traditional consciousness, whether those efforts take the

form of new laws that quickly begin to lose their \ i tality career aspirations,
'

,

or t ransformational attempts in a job setting.
Finally, v.·hat I have called an alternative consciousness is not just for
artists. It's not just for professionals, lawvers, and teachers. There was talk
this morning about unemployed artists driving taxis. Vv'hat about people
who drive taxis all the time? They are not artists. But I have heard people
who work as short-order cooks, for example, talk about what they do at

9:30 in the morning-slicing tomatoes-as in some vvav an expression of
their involvement with the people who are g oing to eat those tomatoes. I
suggest that the real task is to envision the wavs that all of us, in c l uding
those of us who are not artists, have within us this dissonance. vVe h ave
within us a set of work norms that in some sense seems inevitable, but t h at

in another sense is forced on us as part of the traditional consciousness.
Theodore Bike! 's storv about the Bureau of Labor statistics and the
unemployment ligures is true for thousands of people besides artists. There
are literally thousands of people. whether they are cab driYers or teachers,
working at so m ethi ng less than vvhat thev want to do. Of

course,

that fact

does not end the matter. Sure. a lot of p e opl e would like to he president of
the United States; the y are not all u nemploy e d simplY beetuse the position
is no t open,just as t h e fact that there is mor e to the uti l i t v ofvour work than
the market doe s not mean that vve all defi n e the utilit\· of our jobs. vVe
don't; it is more complex than that. But there are mzmy, many people
ca u ght in t he situation of the un e m ploy e d artist dri'.'ing a cab who is told
that he is no lo n g e r an u n c mplov ed artist, he is an empiO\ecl cab driver.

i;Vhethcr
morning or

we

l o ok at the aspect of the

art world being discussed this

more b ro a d l v at the arts, as the world e':ol•:n the traditional

consciousness tends to ;ake over, even in t h o s e areas like the professions
whe re it is the

last place to be felt. Certainly. in law and in t e ac h in g. the

bureaucratization and ''proletarianization·'
ceeding ap a c e

.

of those profes�ions are pro

I \\aS interested to find this conference focmed on an asp e ct

of the arts \\·here this phenomenon seems much less true. I
there arc other

a r e as

21m

sure t h a t

of the arts -.vhere it is true. :-hose of vou who fo!lmv

legal issues know thai rece n t l y the Supreme Court of the' Cnited States, in
the Yesh iua Unic·ersi�v case, told teachers they -..Yere not ern plovees at all
because they had discretion O'.-er their -work that employees tvpically do not
hm·e. In o th e r

words, because thev had so m e or the ingredients of self

clire c::i o n that J ha\·e associated with the alterna�i\e
Coun said thev were not
the

e m plo v e e s

,

Labor Relations Acr. The Court said that
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j udgment because it is t h e u n ivers i t y ' s policy, in its self-in t e rest , t o h ire
people on that basis. In o t her wo rds , as a teacher I have indepe n de n ce of
j u d gmen t because t h e u n iversit y vvan t s me to have it. T h at was n ews t o me
,
a n d it was n o t exac t ly reassu rin g . It is als o interesting t hat in call i n g me an
indepe n d e n t professional, t h e court vvas n o t raisin g my status b u t was tak
ing awav a legal righ t . o n e I mav or may n o t have wan t e d , bu t w h ic h I
o t h erwise would have had. It has doubtless been t h e i n c reasin g b ureaucra
ciza t i o n , the decl i n i ng au t o n omy of professions l ik e t e aching t hat has led to
such de\·elopmen ts as u n io n i zation. The v i ew t hat t h e professions are dif
ferent is expressed t o make people in t hose fields mo re v u l nerable t o tec h
n ological and societal c hanges that are making t h e differe nces less real.
So t h e task that I see for us, pen e tratin g t he limi tat i o ns of the t radi
t ional co nsciousness in attempt ing to c o n struct legal principles t h a t are
respo nsive to something broader , is one t h at t h e fiel d of the arts is cent ral
t o . but t h at goes far bev o n d i t.
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